Reading Appellate Court cases can occasionally be as entertaining as reading a good detective fiction novel. The difference, of course, is that the Appellate Court cases arise from real life situations involving real people and their actions. Take, for example, the recent California Appellate Court case of Harnedy v. Whitty, decided on July 30, 2003. The legal holding in this case is probably less interesting than the facts and so I will save the legal holding for a brief discussion at the end of this newsletter. Therefore, I present to you the facts of this case as described by the Appellate Court:
"This litigation involves a dispute between a brother and sister regarding the ownership of the property of their deceased parents, property originally put into a trust by those parents but then, after the death of the mother, quit claimed to the daughter by a very sick father a few weeks before his death. The son is plaintiff and respondent William J. Harnedy, hereafter respondent. The daughter is defendant and appellant Mary Harnedy Whitty, hereafter appellant. At all times relevant hereto, they had two siblings, Michael Harnedy and Noreen Harnedy. The parents of all four were Mary and William Harnedy of Dublin, Alameda County, They died in, respectively, October 1999 and January 2000.
In October, 1991, the parents created a revocable inter vivos trust called the Harnedy Family Living Trust; which held all their assets, including their home in Dublin. The transfer of the home into the trust was effected by a recorded quit claim deed. The trust provided that the parents would be the original trustees of the trust and appellant and her brother Michael co-successor trustees. The trust document and other testamentary documents, including durable powers of attorney, were kept in a blue binder maintained by the parents.
For a number of years prior to 1999, the father suffered from hydrocephalus and increased dementia. In 1996, he was formally diagnosed as suffering from hydrocephalus and in January 1997, underwent an operation to insert a brain shunt.
By the summer of 1999, the father's condition had deteriorated to the point where he could no longer live at home. He had, among other things, become violent and abusive to his wife and appellant who along with her two children, also lived in the Dublin home. In the same summer, the mother, Mary Harnedy, was hospitalized for severe heart problems. During a visit to her at the hospital, the father became so loud and abusive to her that he had to be removed from the hospital.
In September 1999, Appellant had her father placed in Oak Creek Alzheimer and Dementia Care facility. From then until his death the following January, appellant had effective control over him, the care facility in which he was placed, and his finances. After the hospitalization of the mother appellant took possession of the blue binder containing the trust documents and powers of attorney. Shortly after the mother's death in October 1999, and even before her funeral appellant made arrangement via an attorney to have her brother, Michael Harnedy, sign a resignation from the office of co-trustee (or co-successor trustee - the record is unclear on this subject). But, according to the testimony of both parties and Michael, this resignation never took effect. In any event, appellant was able, apparently with the concurrence of Michael, to gain control of two of her parents' savings accounts totaling $70,000. With those funds she opened a new account under the name of the ‘William Harnedy Trust, Mary B. Whitty, Successor Trustee'. She never told respondent about any of this.
In the fall of 1999, and contrary to the sentiments of respondent who wanted his father to remain at Oak Creek, appellant moved him to a facility known as Eden Villa. This move was undertaken by appellant primarily due to cost considerations. The father reacted violently to this move, attacked a nurse at Eden Villa, and after only one day was sent to Highland Hospital on a commitment under Section 5150 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
During the entire year of 1999 the father's condition continued to deteriorate. He could not carry on a conversation with his sons, had trouble recognizing them, and would drool and mumble and look at them blankly. On November 30, 1999 the father was admitted to Kaiser Hospital in Walnut Creek in critical condition. He was unable to breath on his own and an endotracheal tube was inserted. The father stayed at Kaiser for only ten days, and was then moved to the Parkview Hospital in Hayward.
During the same month, appellant discussed her father's condition with a friend in the real estate business and thereafter bought a blank quit claim deed form from a stationery store. From the blue binder she now controlled, she obtained the property description of the Dublin real property and attached a copy of that description to the quit claim deed form. On December 10, 1999 appellant brought the quit claim deed to Kaiser Hospital and also arranged for a notary public to be present. By that point, the father was too ill and weak to sign his name. Additionally, although for some time he had needed magnifying glasses to read, he did not have those glasses on at the time he executed the deed. Nevertheless, the father placed an ‘X' on the document next to his name; and appellant placed her initials next to the ‘X' and the notary notarized his signature. The deed removed title to the Dublin home from the trust and put it in appellant's name only. According to appellant's testimony at trial, she did this because her father had told her numerous times that he wanted her to have the family home.
An expert medical witness testified that, as of December 10, 1999, the father suffered from significant defects in his thought processes as demonstrated by repeated hallucinations and delusions and, as a consequence, was unable to understand and appreciate the consequences of his actions on that date.
On December 11, 1999, the father was discharged from Kaiser to a facility at Rossmoor for physical therapy. His discharge notice stated that he was suffering, among other things, from dementia, hydrocephalus, pneumonia and anemia. As noted earlier, he died in January 2000. Not until after his death did appellant reveal that she held a quit claim deed for the Dublin property. Appellant recorded the deed herself on February 17, 2000.
Appellant and her two children have lived at the Dublin homesince before her father's death. She has never paid any rent, provided any accountings to her siblings, nor distributed any of the trust corpus. Indeed, at the time of trial she testified that she had spent approximately $40,000 of the trust corpus."
As you can probably tell, the Appellate Court was quite critical of the daughter's actions in obtaining the quit claim deed to the family residence from her father in these circumstances. The trial court ruled generally in favor of the plaintiff brother and ordered cancellation of the quit claim deed. The daughter appealed, using technical legal arguments regarding her brother's "standing" to bring the action and improper jurisdiction of the trial court. The Appellate Court made short work of the daughter's arguments and affirmed the trial court's decision.
And so, my friends, like a good detective fiction novel, "The Case of the Suspect Quitclaim Deed" ends with justice prevailing and the return of the family home for distribution pursuant to The Harnedy Family Trust as intended by Mr. and Mrs. Harnedy.
